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A DYNAlvUC THEORY OF COMPE TI TION 
Burton H. Klein 
I. COMPE TITION AND PROGRESS 
What is the relationship between competition and progress? 
It can be assumed that as of any given moment technologies provide 
different potentials for satisfying human desires. For example, it can 
be assumed that if Henry Ford had decided to enter, say, the pin making 
rather than the automobile business, he would have found in the former 
a lower potential: even if the elasticity of demand for pins were very 
high, there simply may have been no real opportunity to bring about a 
significant reduction in the cost. In other words, the potential as far 
as pin making was concerned might ha\i·e been more or less cornpletely 
exhausted. And if we assume an economy of pin mills, then obviously 
there could be little or no competition in ideas and no real progress. 
Another way of describing a world in which tht:: technological 
potentials have been entirely exhausted is by observing that in such a 
world competition can produce no better results than in a zero-sum 
game. To be sure, there can be gains from trade. But after these 
gains have been exhausted no one can be made better off without making 
someone else worse off. 
By way of contrast, consider the remarkable degree of progress 
which was made in heart operations during the past twenty rears. How 
was this progress brought about? Teams of surgeons assumed that 
this was a field in which there was a substantial potential for discove ring 
better operating techniques. In other v.'ords, it was a field in which 
surgeons recognized their ideas were but partial truths. And there 
was very intense rivalry between teams of surgeons to find better 
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approximations to the truth -- rivalry which generated a wide diversity 
of ideas. And it was this diversity of ideas which, in turn, permitted 
remarkably smooth progress in reducing the fatalities associated ·with 
particular types of heart operations. 
Here we have a type of com!'.>etition which quite clearly 
produced better results than in a zero-sum game. The more imaginative 
surgeons quickly developed reputations which allowed them to build up 
their practices very rapidly. It is true they took business away f:::om 
the less imaginative doctors. But the less imaginative doctors were 
able to borrow ideas which simply would not otherwise have been 
available to them. Moreover, no single surgical team had a monopoly 
on good ideas. And since the :improvement in performance depended 
on a number of discoveries (with earlier discoveries providing hints for 
later discoverers), there were, so to speak, innumerable opportunities 
to win a "Nobel Prize." So here quite clearly was a form of cornp.:ctition 
which produced better results than in a zero-sum game, whereby almosL 
everybody was tnade better off -- all except the undertaker whose 
payments were delayed. Indeed, it can be described as a situation 
in which it paid to cooperate by competing. 
ls this, then, a new form of competition? Not at all. Long 
before the scientific movement began in agriculture, farmers were 
cooperating by competing to grow the big'g est potatoes and the fattest 
hogs. In fact, one of the main reasons the early agricultural 
experimental stations were so successful is lhat they were d�ali:ig v.'ith 
the most progressive sector of the United States economy in which 
there was a g e nuine demand for new ideas. 
More generally speaking, it can be argued that the fundan1ental 
reason seven-eighths of the growth of this country took place as a pure 
productivity increase (GNP divided by the weighted inputs)
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is that in the 
exploitation of new technological potentials, competition in this country 
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produced better results than could be achieved in a zero-s_um game, 
Moreover, it also can be argued it was no a c cident that as· of the turn 
of the century this country became the technological leader of the world 
in the introduction of new products into world markets. According to 
Kuznets1 calculations, shortly after the Civil War, when the rapid 
industrialization of the United States economy began, productivity in 
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this country was quite as high as that of any other country in the \.vorld. 
It inay be assumed the fundamental reason for this is that although we 
were still importing most of our industrial technology from Britain, 
American agriculture already was highly progressive. So it is quite 
clear that continued improvements in productivity in this country would 
require us to become a technological leader in discovering new 
technological gold mines, and wringing out their potential. 
Thus, while the growth and trade paradoxes are often regarded 
as guite different paradoxes -- the one a paradox for growth theory, the 
other a paradox for trade theory -- the fact of the matter is that they 
are one and the same paradox. The growth paradox results from the 
fact that classical theory cannot explain why a very large fraction of 
this country's growth took place a s  a pure·productivity increase. 3 On 
the other hand, the trade paradox, as it has been restated by Vernon, 
consists of explaining why we exported newer technologies in exchange 
for older technology. 4 However, as was already indicated, if we had 
not become more or less self-sufficient in the generation of new 
technological ideas, it is quite unlikely the gains in productivity \vould 
have been as rapid as they were. So it can be assumed that our relative 
advantage as a generator of new ideas was intimately related to the 
e conomic development of the United States. In fact, it was not until 
a fter \\'orld Vv'ar II that we recognized ourselves to be the technological 
leader of the world, 
To be sure, it can be argued that from a cost-effectiveness 
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point of view this country would have been better off if the cities of 
Birmingham, Nottingham and Manchester (which were inhabited almost 
entirely by people from Scotland and Dissenters from the Church of 
England a s  of the beg inning of the Industrial Revolution - - Adam Sn1ith 
among them) had continued to have a technological revolution every 
twenty years. Not only are R&D costs much higher than licensing costs, 
but very substantial learning costs are .involved in debugging new 
production processes, However, the British Industrial Re volution was 
mainly centered upon exploiting the potential of a single major discovery - -
namely, the steam engine. And when the potential was exhausted, this 
country had no alternative but to become self-sufficient in the generation 
of technolog ical ideas if it wanted to enjoy a continued increase in 
productivity a long with the discovery of new consumer goods which 
would enable people to enjoy a ·wider diversity of experiences (e. g., the 
radio, television, movies, etc. ), 
Since it is cheaper to be a borrower of ideas than a generator 
of ideas, it is not very surprising that on the whole the other major 
e c onomies of the world were able to increase productivity somewhat 
more rapidly than the United States. This is indi ca lt:d by Kuznets' 
international comparisons of labor productivity: 
Annual Increases in Productivity, 1900-19605 
United States 1. 5 
United Kingdom 1. 2 
Sweden 2. 5 
Japan 2. 7 
Germany 1. 3 
France 1. 4 
It is true that for the period as a V.'hole, the performance of neithee the 
United Kingdon1, Gern1any nor France \\·as apprc:ci2bly better than that 
of the United States. But after Vv"orl.d \Var II thl-re was a very ren1arkablc 
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improvement in the pe rformance of both Germany and France. Thus, 
according to Denison's estimates, during the period 1950-1962, total 
factor productivity in Germany increased at about three times the 
British rate, and in France at about twice the British rate. 6 So given 
the fact this country was the technological leader during this period, 
the increases in productivity in other countries can be looked upon 
mainly as a process of catching up with our potential, with Japan and 
Sweden displaying the best capability as borrowers and Britain the 
poorest. 
What, then, enabled this country to do as good a job as it did 
in taking advantage of technological potentials? According to the 
conventional wisdom, our advantage in educa tion played a major role in 
explaining both the growth and trade paradoxes. Thus, according to 
Denison1s estimates, something like half of the residual is to be 
attributed to investment in human capital, as measured by increases 
in �he number of years of schooling. 7 Vernon and Gruber have argued 
that in trading newer for older technologies, we were trading ''brain 
for brawn. ,.B 
There are, however, two reasons for being skeptical about the 
assumption that it was the advantage in education which was primarily 
responsible for this country's splendid economic performance. - It is 
by no means clear whether investment in education as measured by the 
number of years of formal training is to be regarded as a cause or the 
result of productivity increases. And, v;;hile we seem to hold the samo;;;: 
advantage in education, our economic performance no longer is so 
splendid. As already was indicated, our productivity re volution began 
in agriculture; though it hardly can be argued this was because farmers 
were the most educated people in the country. Furthermore, a number 
of famous American inventors, Thornas Edison an1ong them, never had 
any formal schooling. So how can we be sure whether education was a 
cause or an effect.: an investment good which caused increases in 
productivity or a consumption g ood made possible by increases in 
productivity? 
The second reason for 'being skeptical abo"Jt the educational 
hypothesis is the recent economic performance of the United States. 
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As Chart 1 shows, whereas this country once held a near monopolistic 
position in introducing new products into world markets, it is apparent 
today we no longer do: the United States is now importing about half as 
much of the "technology intensive11 commodities it is exporting. More­
over, as Chart l also shows, Ainerican firms are much less competitive 
than they were with respect to the older technologies. Indeed, the only 
area in which we still seem to have a clear advantage over the rest of 
the world is in agriculture. 
Since a country's most competitive goods enter interna tional 
trade, it can be assumed that when a country's trade position worsens, 
productivity increases will decline relative to other countries. And 
just as B ritain entered her Victorian Age with relatively poor ·performance 
in both productivity and trade, so is the case in the United States. A_s 
Chart 2 shov;:s, in manufacturing , the rale of productivity incr<:'asc has 
declined so much relative to other countries that we are now falling 
behind Britain. 
How, then, is the relatively poor performance of the United 
States economy to be explained? If we dismiss the education argument, 
there would appear to be two plausible hypotheses : (a) that it reflects 
a vanishing of technological opportunities; and (b) that it reflects a 
decline in competition. Economists have, of course, long recognized 
that advances in technology tend to be bunched in time - - with advances 
in one field leading to advances in another. So acr::eptance of the first 
hypothesis would place main emphasis on the fact that the post-World 
V..rar II industrial revolutions se,em to be dying out. 
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Graphs taken from Science, 179 (l\i-1a:rch 2, i973), Michael Boretsky. 
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But a decline in the potential can lead to a decline in competition 
in ideas - - and a decline in competition in ideas to a poorer ability of 
a n  economy to open up new potentials. Thus, the second hypothesis 
does not necessarily assume the potential of a technology will always 
remain the same, What it does assume is that progress is not 
automatic - - a decline in competition in one period can bring about a 
poorer ability to promote progress in the next. For example, the 
dying out of the technological revolutions in Britain may have a good 
deal to do with the fact that they were centered on exploiting the potential 
of a single invention: the steam engine. But the British economy may 
not have recovered to this very day from the Great Depressioll of 1880 
in the sense that never was there a recovery of competition in Britain. 
So, if economists do not try to understand the relationship between 
competition and progress, we may find what has happened in Britain 
will happen here also. 
11, THE NEED FOR A DYNAMIC THEORY 
The principal difference between the two hypotheses suggested 
previously is that, whereas the first assumes an automatic theory of 
progress, the second does not. An automatic progress theory is one 
which assumes the knowledge for productivity gains is brought about 
outside of the economic system -- and more or less routinely is 
translated into producing a given level of output with fewer inputs. For 
example, many economists not only assume that science is a pail of 
all- purpose knowledge, \Vhich can be turned into useful technology a t  
will, but also that in competition there i s  a more o r  less automatic 
mechanism for taking advantage of improvements in knowledge. If a 
way exists for improving productivity, competition will exploit it; if it 
does not, con1petition is of no avail. And if one takeS this point of view, 
10 
then the trade-off depicted in the Phillips Curve (between the degree of 
unemployment and the rate of inflation} must be taken as a given. To 
be sure, larger gains in productivity would be preferred to smaller 
gains -- larger gains \vould insure a greater opportunity to pay for 
increases in real wages without causing inflationary pressures. H:owever, 
since advances in knowledge are exogenous to the economic systen1, 
there simply is no way to avoid choosing behveen the degree of 
unemployment and the rate of inflation. 
Moreover, if policymakers choose more inflation as the lesser 
of two evils, then it must be assumed that this choice will more or less 
inevitably lead to a greater and greater degree of economic controls. 
True, controls do not deal with the basic problem, which is increasing 
the rate of productivity gain. However, if it is assumed that the rate 
o f  productivity advance is determined by exogenous factors, then the 
only real alternative to a 7 or 8 percent unemployrn.ent rate is econorr.ic 
regulation. Moreover, when regulation does not work as intended, it 
is typically assumed that the problem was not with the medicine, but 
rather with the dose. And for this reason it is no accident that other 
than the Con1munist countries, the British economy is one of the n1ost 
controlled in the world. 
According to the second hypothesis, the trade-off depicted by 
the Phillips Curve need not be taken as a given. As long as there are 
unexploited technological potentials in an economy -- as long as the 
economy is not an economy of pin mills -- the rate of progress can 
be affected by the degree of compe:tition. The degree of competition 
is defined as the degree of interaction between competitors in the risk 
they impose on each other. Let us assume we are observing an industry 
in which competitors face large risks as measured in terms of the 
markets won or lost as a result of the introduction of new products. Io 
such an industry, if a firm wanted to survive, it always would have to 
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b e  balancing two risks: a technological r isk and a competitive r isk. 
At any given moment, firms in such an industry can be confronted by 
serious dilemmas, which involve having to choose between two equally 
unfavorable alternatives; whether acting upon a technological risk 
will result in a commercially successful product or whether it will 
lose a market as a result of a competitor1s introduction of new products, 
So not only is there (1) a high degree of interaction in the 
markets which can be gained or lost as a r esult of the introduction of 
new products, but (2) because competitors never can make probabilistic 
calculations of the risks they face when acting upon or refusing to act 
upon a particular technological risk, they can be said to be dealing 
with risks under conditions of strong uncer tainties. Unfortunately, in 
this case they cannot insure themselves against such risk by buying 
insurance from insurance companies. So what must a firm do if it 
wants to survive? It must cooperate with its competitors by hiring 
some imaginative people to do to its competitors what its competitors 
can do to it! Indeed, as already was pointed out, it is only as a result 
of such cooperation that competition can produce better results than 
can be achieved in a zero-sum game. 
However, business firms not only can cooperate by imposing 
large risks on each other, but they can cooperate by failing to interact 
with each other,  and by imposing risks upon the public at large. Consider ,  
for example, the following situation as described by Adam Smith: 
People in the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment or diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to 
raise prices. 9 
Such a situation can be described as one in which there is a 
zero degree of interaction between competitors in the risk they impose 
upon each other -- as one _which can generate no better results than can 
be achieved in a zero-sum game. Now, no competition might exist 
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either because (1)  the technological potential of the industry in que:�tion 
already has been more or less completely exhausted, or (2) rather than 
imposing risks upon ea-ch othe r ,  firms in an industry prefer to impose 
risks on the public at large. However, unless it is assumed that a11 
the technological potentials have been completely exploited, then there 
is a trade-off other than that depicted by the Phillips Curve. Assurning 
that the inability to cope with inflation inevitably will mean more 
regulation, it is the trade-off between the regulation of monopoly and 
the promotion of competition to better internalize risks. When 
competitors cooperate by imposing risks upon each other ,  the process 
can be described as a risk internalization process in the sense that if 
a competitor decides to act upon technological r isk in order to avoid a 
competitive risk, then he internalizes a risk for society as a whole by 
making the future rate of progress more predictable. And, as an 
alternative to direct re gulation, the government can undertake measures 
to help insure r isks are more fully internalized. For example, if in a 
highly concentrated industry wherein they do not impose genuine risks 
upon each other, firms would face the risk of a dissolution suit brought 
about by the government. And labor unions might be made to feel more 
risk if by imposing ser ious constraints on the ability of firms to bring 
about productivity advances, they too were made to feel the r isk of 
dissolution. Moreover, there are a variety of ways the tax structure 
might be revised to encourage a greater degree of risk-taking. For 
example, by favoring smaller firms, a more steeply graduated 
corporation incon:-ie tax might encourage more risk- taking. Thus, 
once it is acknowledged competition and productivity gains are r e lated, 
then we can consider the trade-off between those measures designed 
to regulate monopoly and promote risk iD.ternalization. 
Howe ver, there is an even more fundan1ental trade-off than 
in the type of regulation which is involved. There is the trade-off 
13 
between micro- and macrostability. As used in this paper, the term 
100 percent n�icrostability means completely predictable microbehavior. 
For example, if the teams of surgeons engaged in heart operations were 
completely predictable inasmuch as they never g enerated nor borrowed 
any new ideas, they could be described as enjoying complete micro­
stability. On the other hand, if, as a result of making new discoveries 
and rapidly adopting the more successful ones, smooth progress was 
made with respect to particular types of heart operations, then these 
surgeons would be enjoying rnacrostability: the more rapid the rate 
of increase, the g reater the degree of macrostability. Because 
"macrostability" is a key concept in dynamic theory, it will be discussed 
in g reater detail. For the moment however, the m.ain point to be 
emphasized concerns the trade- off between micro- and macrostability: 
it is impossible for a society to s·imultaneously conserve its micro- and 
macrostability. Entirely predictable societies, it should be ap?arent, 
can enjoy 100 percent microstability while possessing a zero degree of 
macrostability. Conversely, the more rapid the rate of progress, the 
g reater the requirement on unpredictable microbehavior. 
One way to think about the difference between micro- and 
m.acrostability is to think about the difference between the United States 
and B ritish economy as of, say, twenty years ago. It is no accident 
the Phillips Curve was discovered first in B ritain. Unlike this country, 
since the turn of the century Britain has had a chronic inflation problem. 
Moreover, anyone farrllliar with dynamic economic theory could predict 
that B ritain \vould have a relatively poor ability to bring about 
productivity gains. It is apparent from Marshall1s description of the 
B ritish economy that B ritain is a country which features micro- and 
not macrostability. As the most outstanding observer of B ritish reality 
since Adam Smith, Marshall described British society in t�rms of a 
semi-closed system paradigm: a paradigm which emerged from 
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Darwinian biology and consequently assumes all evolution takes place 
in terms of a given environment. lO Such evolution takes the form of 
an increasing degree of specializa tion - - as an inbreeding process -­
and is highly predictable. As Marshall himself .made the point in the 
frontispiece to his book: Natura non facit saltum (nature does not 
change by leaps). And a nation which features a high degree of micro­
etability simply cannot feature a high degree of macrostability. 
Conversely, in the past the United States was a country which 
featured macrostability rather than rnicrostability. This is apparent 
from the fact that as the technological leader of the world for about 
half a century we were the most predictably unpredictable country in 
the world. It could not be predicted just what particular advance \'lould 
come out of the United States next, but the United States could be counted 
upon to lead in introducing new products. And it was this high degree of 
unpredictable m:icrobehavior which, in turn, made the ra te of progress 
highly predictable. 
As will be shown, the real significance of competition which 
can produce better results than can be achieved in a zero- sum garne is 
that it is the degree of interaction of competitors which determines the 
macrostability of a country. And if we assume such a relationship does 
exist, then the need to introduce dynamic theory into economics is quite 
apparent: it is to make econo1nists more aware of important trade-offs 
not disclosed by static theory. 
III. THE ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC THEORY 
Dynamic theory has three principal elements. First, it has 
a dynamic concept of stability: the ability to make smooth progress in 
overcoming dilenunas. Second, it has a dynamic concept of competition: 
interactions between competitors wh:.ch can genera te better results than 
in a zero- sum game and thereby promote macrostability. Third, it has 
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a central and unifying concept; the concept of 11openness. 11 It is a 
central element, because it enables us to explain how people can use 
hints obtained as a result of the diversity of their experiences to generate 
new ideas. Without such a capability people would become prisoners of 
their environments. It is the unifying element, because the concept of 
openness enables us to relate microbehavior to rnacroperformance. 
Assume that the rate of progress in an industry declines by a factor of 
two. Then we should be able to predict the change in the internal 
characteristics of firms associated with that loss of macrostability. 
The concept of 11opennessn is not new. Known as the concept 
of an "open system, '1 it has been responsible for the post-Darwinian 
revolution in biology. However; while writing a book on economic 
dynamics
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I was fortunate to discover the key ideas contained in 
mo�ern biology were anticipated in the writings about democracy by 
Thomas Jefferson and Lazare Carnot. Lazare Carnot is mainly known 
for having pioneered (with his son, Sadi Carnot) the science of thermo­
dynamics. But in his earlier writings, he, like Jefferson, developed a 
theory of democracy around the concept now known as an "open system. " 
This was a fortunate discovery inasmuch as it enabled me to clearly 
understand the relevance of the concept as far as economics is concerned. 
After describing these three elements of dynamic theory I will 
return in the final section of this paper to the application of dynamic 
theory to policy issues. 
III- 1 .  The Concept of Macrostability 
In Keynesian economics the generally accepted definition of 
macrostability is "prosperity without inflation. 11 However, there is no 
explicit recognition for the need for productivity gains. In fact, Keynes 
was quite explicit in leaving this out of his theory: 
We take as givens the existing skill and quantity of available labor, 
the existing quality and quantity of available equipment, the ex.istin� 
technique, the degree of competition, and habits of the consumer. 1 
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It is somewhat surpr1s1ng Keynes assumed a Ricardian world, because 
no one was more critical of classical equilib1·ium theory. 13 lv1oreover, 
the General Theory can be regarded as a first step towards a dyna.mic 
theory inasmuch as it introduced the cybernetics approach into economics: 
on the basis of short- term predictions of the interaction between public 
and private spending decisions, steersmen at the President1s Council 
of Economic Advisors or the British Treasury provide advice and 
monetary and fiscal policies which hopefully will keep the nation's 
economic ship of state on a full employment course. I describe this 
type of theory as economic cybernetics, because it is much like the 
cybernetic theory employed in sailing a ship; the captain makes sbort­
term predictions ·Of the interaction between the waves and the ship, and 
on the basis of such short-term predictions makes corrections necessary 
for keeping on a predetermined course. This is not dynamics in the 
sense to be defined as follows; but neither is it static theory. If the 
captain were to behave as a static system, he would set his rudder in 
New York on the basis of his initial predictions, and hope he would 
arrive in Le Hav:t"e. 
But, while the Keynesian revolution v.ras a revolution only half 
completed because it did not change microtheory, Keynes himself 
certainly cannot be blamed, His mission was to provide a rationale 
for dealing with serious depressions. And for that purpose a reform 
of microtheory was not required. Moreover, as far as Britain is 
concerned, he may have done no serious injustice to the facts by 
ignoring competition. 
However, since the United States is not Great Britain, I propose 
that gains in total factor productivity (GNP divided by the weighted inputs) 
should be regarded as a measure of the macrostability of an econorny. 
Though many economists regard all firms as alike (and microcosms of 
the GNP accounts), it is not necessary to assume that the rate of increase 
in all industries is the same. In fact, I will later show why it cannot 
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be the same. So let us assume that increases in total factor productivity 
can be regarded as the weighted average of all industries: with each 
industry weighted, say, in terms of the proportion of the labor force 
it employs. 
Now, why is this a dynamic measure of stability? For one 
thing, it involves the element of 11time. 11 For another, in all dynamic 
processes the path is crucial because earlier 11experiments11 provide 
clues for later discoveries: the more hints from previous discoveries, 
the more new discoveries which can be made as a result of ideological 
mutations. But in terms of my definition the essential element of a 
dynamic process is that it must involve types of microbehavior which, 
when viewed as single events, are quite unpredictable. In other words, 
dynamic theory is concerned with making prediction on a macroscropic, 
rather than a microscopic basis, 
Particular gains in productivity tend to be quite unpredictable, 
because nature was constructed _in such a way that Inan is required to 
employ his imagination when dealing with dilemmas! Let us assurne 
that a firm would like to develop a machine which is 20 percent more 
efficient than the current menu (though it feels there is a real risk 
involved, there is also a risk a competitor might develop such a machine). 
The members of the firm know the second law of thermodynamics imposes 
practical limits on the efficiency of machines, given the best available 
fuels and ni.aterials, And furthermore, they know if someone can find 
a way to increase the temperature difference by discovering more 
suitable materials, improved fuels or engineering tricks to make the 
machine better approximate an ideal reversible machine, they will have 
a superior product. Knowing this. they find themselves on the horns of 
a dilemma (which means being confronted by t\vo equally unfavorable 
alternatives): (I) there is a monetary risk involved in discovering a 
way to build a machine they do not know how to build; (2) there is the 
risk of having a competitor steal the show. 
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What must happen if the firm in question is to resolve this 
dilemma in its favor? The firm must overcome a discontinuity, which 
in my terms means it must acknowledge its previous ideas were only 
partial truths; in other words, it must add to its stock of knowledge. 
Dynamic competition is a competition to obtain new knowledge. More­
over, the behavior involved is dynamic not only inasmuch as it involves 
a change in initial conditions, but also because it involves a quite 
unpredictable change in initial conditions -- a change which simply 
could not be programmed on a computer. 
Knight made the general point very well in the preface to his 
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (written in 1915), when he observed: 
I must regard it as one of the major errors in the classical 
tradition that it failed, and still largely fails to make a sharp and 
correct theoretical distinction between the working of a systen1 
under given conditions, including movement towards equilibrium, 
and changes in the given conditions o;: content of the system itself. 14 
And he himself helped make the distinction clear when he pointed out in 
his later writings that; 
It is practically impossible to imagine any investment in the real 
world which is not in some degree rationally experimental, in the 
sense of being reasonably expected to lead to kno\vledge having 
some enduring economic significance. That is, al\�nvcst1ncnt 
consists, in part, in investment in new knowledge. 
The distinction between the workings of an economic system 
under given conditions and changes in initial conditions is that, \Vhereas 
the former involves highly predictable problem solving activities, the 
latter involves quite unpredictable additions to the stock of knowledge. 
The distinction, in other words, is the distinction between a systern 
working under conditions of weak uncertainties and a system working 
under conditions of strong uncertainties. And the degree of uncertainty 
obviously will depend on the extent initial conditions are changed. 
1 9  
Improving the efficiency of a machine b y  only 2 percent will involve 
overcoming only a minor discontinuity, and, therefore, will not require 
the degree of unpredictable behavior involved in bringing about a 20 
percent advance. In other words, there is a trade-off between the degree 
of advance sought and the degree of uncertainty involved. 
It should be pointed out technological dilemmas arise not only 
because of practical limits imposed by the second law of thermodynamics, 
but also because although engineers might like to scale a machine now 
being used in another application to obtain better efficiency (e.g., scale 
turbine engines so they can be used in automobiles), there are constants 
in the laws of nature and in materials which prevent scaling at will. In 
fact, Galileo is usually credited with making this discovery, because 
when in his Two Sciences he asked how big a bone would be required 
to build a dog twice as high, he found it simply could not be done without 
the
. 
invention of a stronger bone. And for this reason, it is often said 
Galileo discovered engineers are needed to invent new kinds of bones! 
It should be apparent, therefore, no one really can deny the existence 
of dilemmas without denying the laws of nature as they have been known 
since the time of Galileo. 
Moreover, surprises do not occur only in research and develop­
ment activities. There are substantial learning costs involved in taking 
the bugs out of new production processes and in retraining workers. In 
fact, one of the main arguments made by people in the automobile 
industry for concentrating production so an entire rang� of, say, 
inter1nediate automobiles can be produced in one plant is that such 
concentration permits the concentration of learning. 
Wringing out the potential of a new technology ordinarily 
involves finding ways to overcome limits imposed by both the second 
law of thermodynamics and scaling. And because the opportunities 
eventually become exhausted -- or are assumed to be exhausted - -
improvements generally take the form of an S-shaped curve (see 
Chart 3). The overall shape of the curve is very smooth, almost as 
if it were preordained. Ho•vvever, the smoothness can be explained 
only as a result of quite unpredictable types of 'behavior involv,�d in 
overcoming discontinuities. As is indicated, the typical picture is a 
series of discontinuous steps, with the discontinuities becoming 
smaller as the peak of the curve is reached, 
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It should be apparent, however, that whereas the shape of 
these curves tends to be the same, the time required to reach the 
plateaus might be ten years -- or it might be fifty years. And :Lf my 
hypothesis is correct, it is the degree of competition which determines 
how rapidly the potential is exploited. 
Whal: happens when the potential of a particular technology is 
exhausted? In some fields, we can observe only one S-shaped curve. 
But in others, for example, con1-mcrcial aircraft, a discO\"ery like the 
jet engine resulted in a new S-shapcd curve at just about the sa:me time 
the potential of piston-driven aircraft was being reached. So, here 
there was evidently a case with a greater potential (see Chart 4). Or 
in the field of chemistry or computers, we can observe overlappini; 
S-shaped curves (see Chart 5). And it may be assumed these involved 
an even greater potential. 
To conclude this part of the discussion: the degree of macro­
stability an economy can achieve depends on its ability to engage in 
unpredictable lnicrobehavior in exploiting nc'.'.r t0chnological put<·nti;:\ls. 
And the trade-off between n;_icrostability and n;_acrostabilily arises from 
the fact that the greater the degree of macrostability which is required, 
the stronger are the uncertainties involved, and the stronger the 
uncertainties, the greater the requirement on unpredictable micro­
behavior. Ho\\·ever, it should not be assumed that dealing with strong 
uncertainties constitutes ''abnorn;_al'' behavior, and dealing with weak 
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uncertainties, 11normal'' behavior. In fact, it later will be shown that 
even when it comes to making substitutions it is impossible to 
simultaneously conserve microstability and macrostability -- that 
even in a world in which no discoveries are made there is a trade-off 
between micro- and macrostability. 
III-2. Static Versus Dynamic Competition 
The second major element in dynamic theory is dynamic 
competition -- a type of competition in which competitors cooperate 
by imposing risks upon each other. In this section two main points 
will be made: the first concerns how competition which leads to a 
diversity of ideas can promote macrostability. The second deals \Vith 
an economy which, though it aims to be self-sufficient in ideas, it :'.Ylust 
be assumed there will be specialization among firms with respect to 
the degree of unpredictable behavior in which they engage. 
lll-2-a. Microdiversity Is the Hidden Hand of :Macrostabilitv 
In static theory it is assumed that all competitors will display 
a zero degree of interaction. l.Vhere there are many firms, they w·ill 
ignore their interactions with their competitors. And when there are 
few, firms will tend to take their interactions into account by limiting 
supply and charging monopolistic prices. But, even though under some 
conditions duopoly can lead to indeterminacy, the main feature of 
competition under static conditions is that it can produce no better 
results than can be achieved in a zero-sum game. 
By cont:rast, when cornpetitors impose substantial risks upon 
each other -- when competing with each other to detect and resolve 
dilemmas -- there is no way they can make probabilistic calculations 
of the risks involved. And because they cannot, I define dynamic 
competition as "competition under conditions of strong uncertainties." 
Now, what must a cornpetitor do if he hopes to survive in an 
industry in which the degree of interaction is very high? He obviously 
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cannot take out insurance against such a risk. Therefore, he must 
hire itnaginative entrepreneurs. And what is the output in a competition 
between imaginative entrepreneurs? The output is a diversity of ideas. 
Moreover, it should be emphasized it is because entrepreneurs cannot 
make probabilistic calculations of their technological ari.d competitive 
risks that dynamic competition generates a diversity of ideas. 
It is important to note, however, that whether the diversity of 
ideas generated is wide or narrow will depend on the degree of risk 
competitors impose on each other. When firms are dealing "vith highly 
unpredictable competitors, it will pay them to be highly unpredictable 
if they want to survive (e.g., the case of the chemical industry). On 
the other hand, in an industry in which a competitor takes only small 
risks, it will pay to be only slightly more unpredictable -- and the menu 
of alternatives will change more slowly (i.e., the case of the automobile 
indUstry). And in the limiting case -- close to a zero degree of risk -­
where gasoline stations are located on four corners of an intersection, 
and symmetry of behavior rather than diversity of behavior V"till be the 
rule of the day. Thus, it may be assumed that the diversity of ideas 
generated will be a function of the degree of interaction. 
But, how would we know whether a low degree of interacti,on 
was indicative of a low technological potential, rather than a low 
propensity to take risks? If we simply assume that the technological 
opportunities are bounded by what industries are doing at the moment, 
then our predictions will be wrong. In fact, in my book, Dynamic 
Economics, I looked into some fifty revitalizing inventions - ·· inventions 
which provided a relatively static industry with new S-shaped curves -­
inventions such as the diesel locomotive, the jet engine, synthetic fibers 
and computerized machine tools -- and was unable to find a single case 
in which the revitalizing invention was produced by a major firm in the 
16 
industry. Actually, the only major industry which has not had to 
rely upon newcomers to the field for its discoveries is the chemical 
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industry. However, much longer than any other industry, the chemical 
industry has been characterized by a high degree of competition and a 
very wide diversity of ideas. 
Therefore, when there is a low degree of interaction in a 
highly concentrated industry it sirnply cannot be assumed the reason 
is the lack of a real technological potential. And, if the industry in 
question cannot meet foreign competition, then we can be quite sure 
it prefers to cooperate by imposing risks upon the public at large. 
Now, let us turn to the central question: what is the relationship 
between microbehav·ior and macrostability? In order to devise a 
predictive theory it is necessary to relate the ability of firms to deal 
with risks to their internal characteristics. However, the first 
important step in the argument consists of relating the diversity of 
ideas which an industry can generate to the degree of macrostability 
which can be attained. 
As it happens, there are types of diversity associated with 
competition under both static and dynamic conditions: in the former 
case, diversity in the form of well-defined substitutes, and in the 
latter case, diversity of ideas which result from attempts to detect 
and resolve dilemmas. And each form of diversity implies a distinctly 
different concept of stability: diversity in the form of substitutes implies 
low variance outcomes; and diversity in the form of ideas, the ability 
to generate a smooth irreversible process. 
Thus, Marshall1s discovery of the concept of the elasticity of 
denland disclosed that the availability of substitutes can provide an 
economy with redundancy. The associated type of insurance provided 
by redundancy is static in nature; with a greater availability of 
substitutes, consumers and business firms are assured the possibilities 
of lower variance outcomes, 
On the other hand, competition which promotes a diversity of 
ideas, say, in finding ways to reduce costs, provides a dynamic 
insurance policy for reducing the risks of inflation. And, whereas 
Daniel Bernoulli utilized his Uncle Jacob1 s  law of large numbers to 
devise a s tatic insurance principle, the same logic can be used to 
construct a dynamic insurance principle. When people buy fire 
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insurance they bring the law of large numbers to their side in a once-and­
for-all manner by converting strong uncertainties for the individual into 
weak uncertainties for the society. But, if risks are internalized to the 
appropriate degree, people and business firms can be motivated to 
generate a diversity of ideas for reducing the probability of fires. To 
be sure, not all the discoveries will be succes sful. But with a wide 
diversity of ideas we can bring the law of large numbers to our side 
for the purpose of generating smooth progres s in reducing the probability 
of fires . 
So, as far as smooth ·irreversible processes are concerned, 
this is the central conclu sion: microdiversity is the hidden hand of 
macrostability ! However, the rate will depend upon the degree of 
interaction. Suppose that we hci.ve a high degree of interaction between 
competitors and a reasonable amount of luck in making discoveries. 
Then progres s in the industry is likely to be s mooth and rapid (i.e., a 
high degree of macrostability). On the other hand, if the degree of 
interaction is low, then, instead of smooth fast history, we will have 
smooth slow history. But in either case, progress when ploft�d on 
a rnacroscale will be s mooth. 
In the following charts there are shown three fairly typical 
examples of smooth irreversible proce s s e s  -- proces ses in which an 
enormous quantity of hints were used up by organizations possessing 
high degrees of openness to generate the technological options required 
for s mooth progres s .  In the case of piston engine commercial airliners,  
it can be seen that after the DC- 3 the rate ".'.':f progress diminished. And 
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if a curve were plotted for jet engines, a new S - s haped curve would be 
obtained - - both in terms of costs and flying time s .  It is interesting 
to note the jet engine was developed by res olving a major scaling 
dilemma: turbine engines were initially developed for use in Swiss 
mines. Whittle took on the job of dis covering a new kind of bone so 
they could be used in airplanes. The curves for jet engines to not show 
evidence of a diminishing rate of progress; but recently there has been 
definite evidence of a decline. In the case of computers ,  there is , as 
yet, no definite evidence of a leveling off in the rate of progress. 
The important points to be emphasized, however, are these: 
first, without competition to generate a diversity of ideas, it simply 
would be impo s s ible to explain the remarkably smooth progre s s  shovv-n 
in the last three charts. Second, look into the history of any of thes(; 
pro�ects and you will find their d·evelopment was by no means smooth. 
Call it confu s io n  on a microscale, small revolutions or anything you 
wish. But it is crystal clear that without a high degree of unpredictable 
microbehavior to generate a diversity of idea s ,  a high degree of 
macrostability s imply could not have been obtained. 
It is true, of course, when discuss ing competition which leads 
to a diversity of ideas that, in tu:rn, can produce a high degree of 
macrostability we are: not talking about competition presided over by 
Adam Smith 1 s  chief clerk in a pin mill, but, rather, competition bet•11een 
genuine entrepreneurs who must, best they can, weigh risks under 
conditions of strong uncertainties. Unfortunately, Adam Smith lived 
before the e s s e ntial ideas in dynamic proces ses were regarded as 
common sense. Though his concept of the chief clerk has survived 
from generation to generation of economists , it certainly must be 
acknowledged that Adam Smith 1 s  great contribution to economics was 
0the concept of competition" - - and not the concept of a chief clerk. 
So, how can we do him greater honor than by constantly searching for 
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better arguments for competition? Moreover, it must be remembered 
Adam Smith was against tyranny of all kinds. And what better way to 
insure a society against tyranny than to insure it  can generate a 
dive r s ity of idea s ?  
III- 2-b. Specialization in Risk- Taking 
If technology is to be employed efficiently and widely, and, indeed, 
if its own prog r e s s  is to be stimulated by such u s e ,  institutional 
and ideological adjustments must be made to affect the proper u s e  
o f  innovations generated b y  the advancing s t o c k  of human 
knowledge .  Simon Kuznets 17
No organization has an unlimited ability to deal with strong 
unce r tainties. In fact, I shall argue in the next s e ction that the ability 
to engage in unpredictable behavior is a scarce commodity and must 
be conserved. Moreove r ,  the task of being a good generator of ideas 
is so difficult there must be a division of labor between those who 
g erierate new ideas and tho s e  who borrow idea s .  The entrepreneurs 
who generate new ideas are helped by clues from previous experirrients. 
But only by us ing their imaginations can they generate new hypothe s e s  
(which m.a y turn o u t  t o  be good or bad). In other words, such 
entrepreneurs have no alternative but to pursue a ' 1leap before you look" 
policy in generating new hypoth e s e s ,  otherwise it would be impos s ible 
to overcome significant dis continuitie s .  By contrast, entrepreneurs 
who borrow ideas operate mainly on a "look before you leap" policy. 
Now, i t  is true, of cou r s e ,  even a borrower of ideas can - - typically 
does - - encounter unanticipated problems, and must deal with dilemma s .  
B u t  the dilemmas encountered in generating new hypoth e s e s  a r e  more 
s erious and more difficult to deal \Vith. And for this reason there must 
be a division of labor betvi:een generators and borrO\\'ers of new ideas. 
Consider, for example, Bell Telephone Laboratories and 
W e s tern Electric, both o f  which are O\Vned by AT&T. For many years 
the first was a specialist in generating a diversity of ideas and the 
the s e cond, a specialist in applying the "look before you leap" principle. 
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Why did A T & T ' s  succe s s  r e s t  upon having within it quite different 
types of organizations? If there were only a Bell Telephone Laboratories 
we would have lots of marvelous ideas -- but it is quite unlikely we 
would have a dependable telephone s ystem. On the other hand, if there 
were only a Western Electric, then we would h2.. 1;e dependability, but 
with a slow rate of prog r e s s .  Likewise ,  if  the aircraft companies had 
operated their own airlines, progre s s  might have been purchased at the 
expense of dependability; and if the aircraft companies had developed 
their own airliner s ,  dependability a t  the expense of progr e s s .  Indeed, 
during the 1920s there was a joint ownership of aircraft and airline 
compani e s .  But, inasmuch as they became s e parat�d, it is apparent 
there is an advantage in s p ecializing in more or less  predictable 
a c tivities .  
Along with specialization between generators and users of 
ideas is also cooperation. Quite obviou sly, it was necessary for 
W e s tern Electric and the airline companies to make "ins titutional and 
ideological adjus tn'.lents , 11 if they were to make good use of the "advancing 
stock of knowledg e . " And conversely, the equipment which has been 
introduced into the telephone s ys tern and the airline companies can be 
looked upon as experiments , which provide clues to generate new ideas 
to rri.ake further progre s s .  
And for th.is cooperation to occur there must b e  genuine 
pressures to internalize risks . In the case of airliners , competition 
between airline cornpanies provides the mechanism to internalize ri�.ks 
the mechanism to a s sure there are eager customers for new ideas. In 
the c a s e  of AT&T, because of the long lag in reducing long distance and 
international rate s ,  to take into a ccount reductions in costs there was 
a real incentive to s ta y  ahead of the rate maker s .  Moreove r ,  there was 
also direct competition in building large micr ov1ave relay stations, 
unde r s e a s  cables and comrnunica tions satellite s .  
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In the case of industries, such a s  the automobile industry, 
where the rate of progress is much slower, it is normally the sub­
contractors who are responsible for the technological risk-taking. In 
fact,  subcontrac ting has provided one of the principal mechanisms for 
generating a diversity of ideas in the American economy. 
It can be seen, therefore, there is good reason to assume a 
division of labor between generators and borrowers of ideas: there is 
a trade-off between the promotion of dependability and the promotion of 
progress. Moreover, i t  also can be seen there is no Say 1 s  Law for 
ideas which will automatically assure either that supply will create its 
o wn demand, or demand, its own supply. Both conditions are important.
What does this mean in terms of an economy which hopes to 
remain dynamically stable by increasing total factor productivity a t  a 
more or less constant rate? It is true,  of course, that United States 
firms can borrow ideas from abroad. However, for a country like the 
United States to become mainly dependent on foreign sources for its 
ideas would indicate it could not count upon a high degree of macro­
stability in the future. Indeed, whereas it is gene rally assumed that 
we ought to b(::come independent of foreign sources for our petroleum 
supplies, it \vould seem to be even more important for this country to 
continue to be self-sufficient in ideas. 
And being self-sufficient in ideas, in turn, would involve having 
a dive rsity of firms with respect to their ability to engage in unpre dictable 
behavior. To be more specific, Chart 9 portrays lhe pre sent theory 
o f  the firm, a theory developed on the a ssumption of a fully exploited
technology. And Chart 10 portrays a theory of the firm based upon an 
exploitable technology. 
In both cases it is assumed that the ultimate judge of truth is 
the custon1er � - while you may be able to fool some of the people some 
of the time, you cannot fool all of the people all of the time , However, 
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it should be apparent that in some markets competition in the form of 
creating new myths about the product can play a larger role than in 
other s .  So, while this a s s umption will be modified later, what we are 
really as suming is nJ.arkets in \Vhich there i s  a r e a s onably obj e ctive 
b a s i s  for making judgments about quality. 
The principal difference between the two theories of the firm 
is that, whereas the c l a s s i c a l  theory is b a s e d  either on zero or weak 
unce rtainties (i. e . , a world which can be des cribed in probabilistic 
terms ) ,  the s e cond i s  bas e d  upon strong uncertainti e s .  Consider, 
first, the chief clerk of a pin mill. As Chart 9 shows, he obtains 
demand bids from consumers, supply bids from factor markets, and 
from the s e  generate price information to be turned over to an auctioneer 
(the market). The chief clerk may or may not do a g ood job in corr.:puting 
his supply prices .. But if not, he will be informed in no uncertain terms 
in his profit and los s statement. In fact, if an e conomy consisted 
entirely of technologies which \Vere fully exploited, then there i s  no 
reason why c omputers could not be substituted for chief clerks,  and 
the e ntire job taken over by a centralized planning bureau. 
However, even to a borrower of ideas, the world looks very 
different than it does to a chief clerk (Chart 1 0 ) .  In the first place, his 
infor!Uation on new al�ernatives comes to him in the form of incompletely 
d e s c r ibed alternativ e s ,  which is to say, alternatives with large varian c e s .  
What this means i s  that on the one hand i t  is humanly impos s ible for 
borrowers of ideas to maximize their profits ; they simply cannot be 
expected to know about all the incompletely described alternatives i n  
t h e  entire world. O n  the other hand, it a l s o  means that i f  they want 
to survive, the borrowers of new ideas must be c onstantly interacting 
with their outside environments to find out about ne\\' pos s ibiliti e s .  And 
quite obviously, this type of search t a s k  cannot be turned over to a 
computer. Moreover, \.vhile at best, information on consumer de rrLand 
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:may be supplied in the for:m o f  s lowly changing probability distributions ,  
a t  wor s e ,  there can be highly discontinuous changes in demand, 
indicating more ambiguous feedback signals. And such discontinuous 
changes in demand, in turn, can result in highly unpredictable types 
of micro behavior. For exampl� , as a result of foreign competition, 
along with changes in demand for smaller automobiles brought about 
by 'rising fuel costs and inflation, the American automobile industry 
is now b e ing forced to live with more uncertainty than ten years ago. 
And to make its own future more predictable, it has had to take actions 
no one could have predicted. For example , the s tratified charge engine 
developed by the Japanes e  Honda Corporaticn provides a better 
compromise between fuel economy and a low emissions engine than 
did alternatives previously developed by the American automobile 
industry. But who could have predicted, say, ten years ago, that the 
Ford Motor Company would negotiate a technical a s s i s tance contract 
with Honda to help it develop such an engine? Indeed, anyone who has 
read Galbraith' s  arguments on the advantages of large size firms for 
the development of modern technology is surely convinced such a thing 
could not have happened here ! 
So we s e e ,  therefore ,  that whereas chief clerks deal with 
completely certain information, borrowers must be prepared for 
highly uncertain and discontinuous changes in their feedback. And on 
the basis of this feedback they must generate new hypothe s e s ,  and in 
the course of experiments find tha t their hypoth e s e s  \il.'ere only partially 
correct. As engineers are fond o f  pu tt ing the point: "lt1s not what you 
don ' t  knov.· that kills you; i t ' s  what you think you do know ! "  On the 
basis of such exper ime nt s the bets are revised; the ultimate judge of 
1 ' truth1 1  is in fact measured in terms of the share of the market won 
or lost.  
Now a s  far a s  the firms generating new ideas are concerned, 
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they mus t  rely on even more ambiguous information: on hints. And to 
a much greater degree entrepreneurs rnust rely on their irngination to 
convert hints into new hypothes e s .  In fact, as will be explained more 
fully in the next section, it is the ability to use up hints to create new 
ideological mutations v;.,hich constitutes 1 1openne s s .  1 1  Moreover, 
experiment plays a much larger role in generating new ideas, because 
ordinarily entrepreneurs mus t  get married to and divorced from a 
succession of hypotheses before they find an acceptable res olution to 
a dilernm.a. Indeed, the principal distinction between firms engaged 
in generating ideas and those engaged in borrowing ideas is that the 
former tend to view .all their activities and their competitor 1 s  activities 
as experiments which will reveal hints to make better experiments . 
So it can be seen, therefore, that once we as sume an economy 
can provide a high degree of macrostability, because it contains 
generators of ideas as well as borrowers of ideas ,  the economic 
system looks very diffe rent to us fron1 the way it looked before; in 
an e conomic system in which there remain exploitable technologies, 
computers simply cannot be substituted for entrepreneur s .  Indeed, the 
primary advantage of a dynamic capitalist society o ve r  s o c ialism i s  
that it  can do what a computer cannot !  
lll- 3.  The Conc ept of OpennE� s s  
A s  was pointed out earlier, the concept o f  "opennes s "  plays 
two roles in dynamic ccnomic theory. On the one hand, the s e minal 
idea upon which it is based pla ys the same unifying role in dynan1ic 
theory as does the conc e p t  of s pe cialization in cla s s ical theory.  And 
on the o t h e r ,  once we acknowledge there a r e  various degrees of openn e s s ,  
w e  have a link to relate the firrn1s ability t o  deal \Vith technological and 
competitive risks to its external c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
The Seminal Idea: The seminal idea apon which the concept of 
opennes s  is based is a relatively sin1ple one: in varying deg r e e s ,  people 
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p o s s e s s  the ability to 11detach11 hints from particular experience s ,  and 
utilize them to generate new ideological mutations, thereby tnaking the 
whole greater than the sum of the parts. The s ignificance of the concept 
is that without such a capability, man never would be able to interact 
with his outside environment to change the entire system {his own ideas 
plus the e nvironment). Assume, for the moment, that all people acted 
a s  Bayesians. Bayesian probability theory is based o n  the paradigm 
of a semi-closed system (which as sumes the outside environment i s  
taken a s  a given), 18 And the uncertainty dealt with by Bayesian theory 
is how to adapt in terms of a given environment. Moreover, it is 
assumed that in pursuing a 1 1look before you leap11  policy by buying 
information, the underl ying probability distributions are quite s mooth 
s o  s mooth it :really does not make any difference which priors the 
entrepreneur initially selected. 19 In short, it is a s sumed that if all
people were to act as Bayesians there would be no need for them to 
u s e  their imaginations. 
Now, if all people acted like Bayesians, they could be counted 
upon to utilize available opportunities for becoming :more and more 
specialized in terms of a given environment. But, while their behavior 
would be highly predictable, in displa ying such behavior they would 
make the world more unpr e dictable. Why? If his environment ever 
should change i n  an unpredictable way, Bayesian man never could 
detect, much l e s s  resolve, a dilemma. Half the battle in resolving a 
dilemma consists of being able to state it in a fairly precise way. And 
previous experiences can be important insofar as they provide hints. 
But unless an entrepreneur is willing to use his imagination to guess 
at new hypoth e s e s  - - guess in the sense he cannot attach probability 
estimates to the hypothesis until after he has made the guess � - then 
the hints from his experiences (or experiments) will go to waste. 
Thus, v:hile the Bayesians consider themselves to be the mo s t  
n s c ientific" members o f  the economic fraternity, the fact remains 
that if all scientists thought like Bayesians, by refusing to exercise 
their imaginations no new s cientific laws ever would be discovered. 
As the point is rnade on the first page of The Feynman Lectu-res on 
Phys ics: 
4 1  
Experiment i s  the sole judge of s cientific 11truth. 1 1  But what i s  
the source of knowledge? Where do the laws that are to be tested 
come from? Experiment, itself, helps to produce these laws, in 
the sense that it gives us hints. But also needed is imagination 
to create from thf;se hints the great generalizations - - to gue s s  a t  
the wonderful, simple, but very s trange patterns beneath them 
all, and then to experiment to check again whether we have made 
the right gue s s .  ZO 
And s trange a s  i t  may seem, while guessing without being able to a ttach 
a probability e s timate is a very unpr edictable busine s s ,  if scientists 
were unwilling to gue s s ,  the future of science (and scientists) would be 
much le s s  predictable. Likewi s e ,  if engineers never were willing to 
r e solve a s caling dilemma without attaching a prior probability estimate, 
they would remain a prisoner of their experiences. 
In short, whereas incr e a s e s  in the degree of spe cialization 
tend to represent a highly predictable form of evolution, it is fortunate 
human evolution does not entirely take this form, because if it did, 
when reacting to completely new circumstances, man1s future would be 
very unpredictable. This is not to say, howeve r ,  that s pecialization 
does not play a n  important role in hunian progr e s s .  Since no one can 
hope to be an expert on everything, it is quite obvious there must be 
some degree of spe cialization. A completely unspec ialized v:orld - - a 
world of philosophers - - would be a world in which imagination was 
completely detached from reality. On the other hand, there is also 
little doubt that by r educing the diversity of a person1s experiences 
specialization can narrow the scope for imagination. In fact, as the 
following quotation indicat e s ,  Adam Smith himself was aware of the 
limitations of specialization: 
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The common ploughman, though generally regarded as the pat.tern of 
stupidity and ignorance, is seldom defective in his judgement and 
discretion. He is less accustomed, indeed, to social intercourse 
than the mechanic who lives in the town. His voice and language are 
more uncouth . • . .  His understanding, however, being accustomed 
to consider a greater variety of objects, is generally much supe rior 
to that of the other, whose whole attention from morning to r..ight is 2.l commonly occupied in performing one or two very simple operations. 
However, Thomas Jefferson was more of a radical than Adam 
Smith in three important respects. In the first place, his concept of 
stability w a s  a dynamic concept. This is indicated by his often quoted 
statement about 1'constitutions'' :  
Some men look a t  Constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, 
and deem them like the ark and the covenant, too sacred to be 
touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wi sdom 
more than human, and suppose what they did beyond amendment. 
I know that age well; I belonged to it and worked with it. It 
. deserved well of its country . . . .  But I know also, that laws and 
insti.tutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human 
mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as 
new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners 
and opinions change with the change in circumstances, institutions 
must advance to keep up with the times. 22 
Secondly, unlike not only Adam Smith, but practically all the 
members of the period of the Enlightenment, Jefferson believed it 
was possible for the human mind to become more enlightened. In fact, 
he regarded the people who believed the truths were all known as the 
"despots of the earth , " and said, "For as long,as we may think as we 
will, and speak as we think, the condition of man will proceed in 
improvement. 1 12 3  Third, in Jefferson's theory there was no automatic 
hidden hand. His theory of democracy was based on the assumptions 
there was a reclprocal relationship between man and his environment, 
that a highly interactive society could help promote the development of 
the individual, and with more enlightened individuals democracies 
would have a better chance of adapting to new circumstances (i. e, , the 
concept of openness), However, he did not believe the process was 
automatic. And to emphasize this point he preached for a small 
revolution every twenty years, because only by engaging in such 
unpredictable behavior could the future of democracies be made moi�e 
.predictable. 
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As was indicated ear lier, Jeffers on' s thinking anticipates the 
seminal idea upon which modern biology is based. In the nineteenth 
c entury, biologists commonly believed all evolution was Darwinian: 
that evolution took the form of becoming increasingly specialized in 
te r.ms of a given environment. But today it is believed that with respect 
to their openness there is more diversity within the races than between 
the races, and because of such diversity man is better prepared to 
deal with changes in his environment. C. D. Darlington makes the 
point as follows: 
Breeding varies • • .  between the opposite poles of inbreeding 
and outbreeding. With inbreeding, heredity is all-powerful; 
. determination is absolute: the g roup, the population, the c aste 
or the race a:re invariable;  they can be destroyed or removed but 
if they remain nothing can change them. With outbreeding 
heredity disintegrates; recombination produces unpredictable 
variability, endless innovation. Uncertainty, organized uncer­
tainty, dominates not the organism but the population; dete1·mi·­
nation in controlling evolution is transferred to the selective 
power of the environment. Between these two extremes, it now 
appears, every species of animal and plant is adapted to prese .rve 
some kind of balance. 2 4  
In other words, as in Jefferson's theory of democracy, up to 
a point diversity is the hidden hand of rn.acr ostability: as when an 
environment becomes so uncertain it loses its selective capability. 
Later in the discussion this point will be defined more precisely. 
Finally, it is important to point out that biologists have, i11 
turn, strongly influenced the thinking of modern post-Freudian 
psychologists. Psychologists used to believe rn.an had a propensity 
only for security, but not for adventure and risk-taking. And they also 
believed man's personality was formed at a very early age, and could 
not be change d  as a result of interactions with his environment. But 
the following quotation from the work of Erich Fromm will suggest a 
quite different kind of thinking: 
When an individual is born he is by no means facel e s s .  Not 
only is he born with genetically determined temperamental and 
other inherited dispos itions that have greater affinity to certain 
character traits than others, but prenatal events and birth 
itself form additional dispositions . . . •  the formation and fixity 
of the character has to be understood in terms of a sliding 
scale; the individual begins life with certain qualities that 
dispose him to go in c e r tain directions, but his pers onality is 
still malleable enough to allow the character to develop in 
many directions within the given framework. Every step in 
life narrows down the number of poss ible future outcomes • 
Eventually, the freedom of change becomes so minimal that 
only a miracle would seem capable of effecting a change. 2 5 
To conclude this part of the discussion: Openne s s  consists 
of the ability to use up hints to generate new ideological mutatio ns. 
Par.tty for genetic reasons, and partly due to reasons having to do 
with their environment, individuals greatly differ in their openn e s s .  
And one reason we would like to see a n  e conomy with a wide diversity 
of firms i s  that providing freedom of choice to the individual means 
re cognizing these diffe renc e s .  To a s s ume that people are all alike 
in their requirements for security and adventure is quite as wrong 
as to a s s ume that they all have the same preference functions. The 
other reason is that by providing an environment which recognizes 
the development of the individual, democracies can increase their 
freedom of choice when it comes to adapting to new c i rcumstanc e s .
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The Relationship Between Openness and the Internal 
Characteristics of Organizations: As we already have seen, it is the 
ability of firms to generate a diversity of ideas which determines the 
degree of macros tability that can be achieved: the greater the 
dis continuities which must be overcome, the wider the diversity- of 
ide a s ,  and the greater deg r e e  of rnacros tability- which can be a c hieved. 
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And it is openne s s  which perm.its individuals to use hints to genera.te 
new idea s ,  thereby making the whole greater than the sum of the parts. 
Moreover, i t  should be apparent op enne s s  is a matter of degree rather 
than of kind. Opennes s  is the ability to engage in unpredictable behavio r .  
However, with respect not only t o  individual s ,  but also t o  organizations, 
ther e  can be wide differences in the ability to engage in unpredictable 
behavior. At the one extreme there_ is an organization which pos s e s s e s  
s o  high a degree o:E openness it is completely unpredictable. In other 
words, since it im.poses no constraints upon its membe r s  it really is 
not an organization. At the other end of the extreme there. is an 
organization which is so specialized it is utterly incapable of dealing 
with even a minor dilemma and :is completely predictable. 
Between these extremes there is an entire range of organizations 
class ified in terms o f  their openne s s :  
Type I: The Generators of New Ideas 
Type II: The Borrowers 
Type III: The Profit Maximizers 
Type IV: The Risk Transmitters 
Type I organizations mu s t  engage in a greater degree of 
unpredictable behavior than Type II organizations: they have, therefore, 
a greater r e quirement on 1 1openness. '1 This is usually- evidenced by a greater 
degree of interaction with the universities. For example, computer 
companies are more interactive with uni\•e r s ities than the insurance 
companies which use compute r s .  And Type II firms tend to interact 
with a much larger variety of subcontractors than Type III firms - - the 
11pin mill s 1 '  which have close to a zero requir ement for openne s s ,  
Obviously, the more specialized the organization, the more pre dict.able 
its interactions with other organizations. Type IV organizations are 
former profit maximiz ers who have lost their ability to deal with 
unpre dictability, and which, if they are to su rvive, therefore, must 
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transmit the risk to other s .  Included in this category are busines s  
organizations who cooperate b y  imposing risks upon society a t  large, 
and labor unions which are able to conserve their microstability at the 
expense of the inacrostability of society as a whole. For example, 
labor unions, which impose such a high degree of constraint on 
productivity gains a s  to make them pra.f'tica}ly impossible, transmit 
the risk for dealing with in£;Lation to ;, c;:: iety at large. 
Now, I w_ill define an 11equilibril.'. m.11 in a more general sense 
than it is usually defined: an equilibrium means that the degree of 
technological and competitive risk with which iirms must deal in an 
indu s tr y  will rexnain more or less the same. And a s  long as the degree 
of risk remains the same we can a s s ume that firms in the industry_ will 
exhibit more o r  les s the same behavior. This does not mean firms will 
exhibit exactly the same behavior. Firms which have been successful 
in introducing a new product typically display a smaller degree of 
opennes s  than thos e  confronted with adversity. But what it does mean 
is that we should expect a higher average degree of opennes s  on the 
part of Type I entrepreneurs than Type II entrepreneurs .  
The purpose o f  making this a s s umption i s  to permit u s  to 
construct a concept of 11the optimal degree of openne s s ,  1 1  taking as 
givens the initial degree of competitive. and technological risk: assume 
that entrepreneurs in the indu s tr y  in question have a fair idea of whether 
from their own point of view the dilemma in ques tion is likely to be 
' 1minor, '1 ' ' challenging, " or ' 'very s erious , . , Now, if it should decide 
to deal with only minor technological risks, it risks losing a market 
to a competito r .  For example, a computer company which a imed to 
br ing about only a 5 percent improvement in performance would be 
was ting its money, because on the basis of its previous experience in 
the industry it knows its competitors are likely to do a good deal better. 
So, balancing c ompe titive and technological risks does not mean aiming 
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for an incremental improvement -- not in this market. On the other 
hand, the members of the firm also know the larger the advance, the 
greater the degree of uncertainty involved. In fact, it can be as sui:ned 
that if any firm were compelled to deal with a greater and grer..ter 
diversity of hints,  after a point its dilemma-resolving capability would 
fall to zero: 
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S o ,  what does the optimal degree of openness mean'.? In 
general terms, i.t means to be not so timid as to insure one's defeat -­
but not s o  adventurous as to be driven off the precipice. And anyone 
acquainted with real world entrepreneurs will agree, I am sure, that 
what entrepreneurs do not do is to take unnecessary risks, which iLs 
to say they act to conserve their ability to deal with unpredictability. 
Suppos e ,  for example, someone has the choice of opening two 
doors, If he opens the one, a beautiful blond and a million dollars will 
greet him; if he opens the other, a poisoned dart and instant death will 
overtake him. Now, if he decides to make the choice by flipping a coin, 
he is not acting to conserve his ability to deal with unpredictability. 
Conserving one 1 s  ability. to deal with unpredictability means regarding, 
his hints as his most precious asset.  Nor would an entrepreneur ·who 
narrows his supply of relevant hints by insis ting upon selecting them 
from a domain which applies only to blue-eyed blonds who were good 
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'.�ooks· would be acting to conserve his ability to deal with unpredictability, 
because if. he values his life, he would be engaged in undertaking 
unnecessary risks. 
The purpose of constructing the concept, "the optim.al degree 
of openne s s ,  1 1  is twofold. In the first place, it permits us to consider 
a trade-off which has .been implied in the previous discussion, but 
which has not been explicitly considered: the costs involved in nlaking 
certain aspects of an activity more predictable as measured in terms 
of achieving a lo'o/er degree of predictability in other aspects: the 
uncertainty trade-off, In the second place, it provides a means to relate 
the opennes s of organizations to their internal characteristics. I will 
start with the uncertainty trade-off, because only by understanding this 
trade-off can we understand the relationship between the openness of 
org�nizations and their internal interest. 
The Uncertainty Trade-Off: A few examples will tnake clear 
what I mean by 11an uncertainty trade-off. 11 Suppose in the example of 
the entrepreneur trying to choose between two doors, the entrepreneur 
insists upon a wife whose characteristics a:re highly predic table, and 
ignores all hints except as they apply to blue-eyed blonds who are good 
cooks. By imposing arbitrary constraints on his freedom of choice, 
he risks making his own)ife more unpredictable. Or suppose that 
someone decided to ignore uncertainty by not obeying traffic light s .  
Then by choosing to ignore uncertainty h e  would b e  making someone 
else1s or his own life more unpredic table. Or, return to the example 
of heart operations. It has been found that a quick decision on the 
part of a nurse during the recuperation period can be vital in saving 
a person1s life. But what would happen if nurses refused to take 
action without consulting a doctor? Then by making their own lives 
more predictable, they would be making their patient s 1  chances of a 
successful recovery more unpredictable. Or suppose that in order 
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to make the lives of their members more predictable, labor unions 
should decide to resist the introduction of measures which would result 
in technological unemployment in the construction industry. Then,, 
when it came to buying a house, young couples might find that thei:r 
lives are more unpredictable. Conversely, in order for young 
couples to buy a house at a relatively low cost, the labor unions 
would have to give up some of their insistence upon predictability. 
Or suppose that in order to make growth more predictable, it was 
decided to use high sulfur fuel s .  Then growth is being made more 
predictable by introducing a greater degree of uncertainty into the 
environment, which, in turn, means that peoples 1 right to good health 
is being made more unpredictable. And, again, if the environment 
is to be made more predictable, then unpredictable behavior to 
dis cover alternatives to high sulfur fuels is required. 
It should be apparent from thes� examples that the uncertainty 
trade-off can be a trade-off which affects a particular entrepreneur 
engaged in a particular activity -- or a trade-off which affects entire 
societies. But to simplify the discus Sion, let us start off with an 
uncertainty trade-off which affects only a s ingle entrepreneur. 
A s s ume the entrepreneur in question would like to pin down the tin'le 
when the development of the aircraft will be completed; and to do 
that he freezes the design. Now, he may be lucky. The airplane 
may perf orm just as he predicted it would. But he also may run 
into bad luck, and have to deal with a series of dilemmas he 
did not anticipate. So the cost of requiring a high degree of certainty 
in time and technological perforrnance is to make for more 
uncertainty in his time performance (as is shown in Chart 1 1 ). 
Now, i.£ he actually knew the trade-off between time and 
cost beforehand, his problem would be a relatively simple one. 
Assume the uncertainty U(A) associated with a favorable outcome 
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Chart 1 1  
The Uncertainty Trade-Off 
TEC HNICAL PERFORMANCE 
TIME PERFORMANCE 
COST PERFO RMANCE 
of the dilemma A facing the firm is: 
U(A) = KU(x1 ) U(x2) 
where K is a constant (that depends on initial conditions } and x1 
and x2 are the factors upon which A depends. For example, x1 
can repres ent the initial cost goal a nd x2 the initial time goal for 
building the airplane. On the basis of this as sumption the trade-off 
between U{x 1 ) and U(x2) would be smooth: 
U(x1 ) 
U(x2) 
Now, if the trade- off were smooth, then the entr epreneur 1 s  problern 
would be a relatively s imple one. He only would have to d.ecide 
how much time was worth to hi:m. However, while the trad e-off 
s ho wn is much l ike the one contained in the uncertai nty principle 
in physics, once human beings are brought into the equation, we 
5 1  
( 1 )  
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introduce s trong uncertainties, which is to say, life becomes more 
complicated. To convince yourself the trade-off cannot be smooth 
where human beings are concerned, think of a contractor who desires 
to save time in the cons truction of a building, and thinks he kno'N·s the 
trade-off between his cost and time uncertaintie s .  The contractor 
believes if more and more workers are added his initial cost es timates 
will be made more uncertain, because they will get in each othe r ' s  
way. In fact, h e  under s tands that i f  enough workers are added a point 
will be reached in which the outcome will be totally unpredictable, 
with people hitting each other with shovels -- a situation which can be 
described as an infinite amount of motion, but no movement. But what 
he does not know is just when in the process of adding more and more 
workers the process will become totally unpredictable. Once human 
beings are put into the equation, we are forced to acknoWledge the 
world social scienti�ts observe is a world of strong uncertaintie s .  
The entrepreneur in this case cannot see the trade-off curve 
in its entirety. Depending on the degree of uncertainty which is 
involved, he is in a position to unde r s tand the implications of the 
trade-off between time and cost uncertainty only within rather ill-defined 
limits: 
U(x1 1 
U
l{xl ) •-
u1 (x2 1 U(x2 1  
Now, the entrepreneur engaged i n  choosing between two 
doo r s  obviously would s e e  a smaller portion of the curve than the 
entrepreneur who was trying to save time on a construction project. 
U(A) 
But regardless of whether the portion is small or large, by placing 
artificial constraints the entrepreneur cannot demand l e s s  unce!'­
tainty than u 1 (x2 ) in his initial time goal or less uncertainty than 
u 1(x1 ) in his initial cost target. Also, 
if it is as sumed u0(x1 ) 
is the maxin1um uncertainty in cost and u0tx2 ) is the maximuni. 
uncertainty i.n time with which he can cope: 
U(x2 ) fixed U(x1 ) fixed 
U(A) 
�· 
Doixl 
-Uo{x2 
U(x1 ) U(x2 ) 
then it appears the proce s s  of minimizing U(A) defines an upper and 
5 3  
a lower bound f o r  the opti1nal uncertainty i n  the c o s t  goal and the time 
target. Hence, a (successful) optimization proc e s s  requires tha t;  
u 1 1x 1 ) <. U(x 1) < u0(x 1) 
and ( 2 ) 
u 11x21 < U(x2 ) < u01 x2 ) .  
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It is keeping within the se bounds which constitutes the optimal 
degree of openne s s :  r e cognizing that demanding less uncertainty in 
some aspects of an activity will result in more uncertainty in othe r s ,  
and that i f  too much predictability i s  demanded h e  s imply may defeat 
his purpose. In real life the entreprenei.ir is c onstantly engaged in 
making these trade-offs, a s  he becomes married to and divorced from 
a whole series of hypothe s e s .  And this i s  the fundamental reason why 
engaging in r elatively low c o s t  experiments is ari important aspect of 
conse rving his ability to engage in unpredictable behavior. 
What if we were not considering a s ingle action like developing 
an airplane, but rather a number of such actions? The principle would 
be the same. For example, if the Military Services seek a high degree 
of predictability in their time and performance goals, then the country 
must be prepared for a low degree of predictability in their c o s t  e s timate s .  
And if the labor unions impose constraints t o  make the lives of their 
members more predictable, then they will make someone el s e 1 s  life 
l e s s  predictable. In a world of uncertainty it is impossible for s o ciety 
as a whole to conserve its micros tability. 
The uncertainty trade- off will, ·of course, depend on the 
degree of uncertainty involved: the greater the degree of uncertainty, 
the higher the price of insisting on a high degree of predictability. 
However, it e a s ily can be shown that even in the case of statistical 
uncertainties a trade- off does exist. Mrs. Archie Bunke r 1 s  
macrostabiJi.ty objective, we will assume, i s  t o  live within her house­
hold budget and, if poss ible, to put aside a li.ttle pin money for her 
perso nal use (i. e . , an entrepreneurial profit). And furthermo re, 
for sake of the argument, a s sume although Archie adjusts her budget 
to take int6 account chang e s  in the average cost of food, there are 
large day- t o - day varia n c e s .  So it is apparent that if she diligently 
searches for hints about bargains, it never can be predicted what she 
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will buy o n  a given day. Consequently, she is a predictably unpredictable 
s y s tem, subject to statistical uncertaintie s .  Now suppose Archie truly 
enjoys rnicros tability, and to insure his own life will be more predictable, 
he orders his wife to buy particular foods on special days. He s imply 
cannot require more and more pre dictability without jeopa rdizing the 
macr o s tability of the household food budget. Nor can she decide to 
impo se constraints to make her own life more predictable without 
making her que s t  for macrostability l e s s  predictable. Thu s ,  impo;sing 
artificial constraints to make his life or he� life more predictable •.vill 
make the macros tability of the household food budget less predictable. 
Hence, :it i s  impo s s ible to conserve micros tability and macro­
s tability s imultaneously. And the same is true for the firm. If we 
measure rnacros tability in terrns of profits, then it should be apparent 
that were the fir1n to tr y to conserve its microstability by failing to 
make subs titutions the variance in profits would be much larger than 
if its goal were macros tability. 1v1oreover, it should be apparent in 
both c a s e s  we are dealing with a type of behavior highly familiar to 
e conomis t s ,  namely, that d e s c r ibed in Bayesian probability theory. 
Mrs. Bunke r 1 s  prior p robability distributions are provided b y  her tips; 
her posterior distributions ,  by the 1 1experiments ' '  she makes when she 
goes to the store. And, if either households or firms try to pin down 
the experiments which can be 1:nade so as to make their own lives lnore 
predictable, they will make outcomes l e s s  predictable as measured in 
terms of the day-to-day variations in their profits. Thu s ,  even in the 
case of s tatistical uncertainties there is no way microstability and 
macrostability can be conserved simultaneously. 
In the case of strong uncertainties, we should, of cours e ,  
expect a larger uncertainty trade-off. T o  test this hypothes i s ,  a 
student of mine made an experiment with a relatively s imple computer 
simulation model. The model involved fifty firms , and as sumed that 
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the only two factors of production were labor and capital. In this model 
competitors did not compete to steal markets away from each other. 
Rathe r ,  it was -as sumed that the pressure for increas e s  in productivity 
came from either higher wage demands or other increases in the price 
of inputs. Firms were as sumed to s a tisfice in terms of some spe cific 
profit rate until input prices went up. Then �ey searched for ways to 
improve productivity. The term 1 1 technology11  which appears on the 
following chart indicates a 0technological recipe11 and measures how 
widely o r  narrowly they s earched. Macros tability was measured in 
terms of price s tability over a fifty- year period, And the purpose of 
the experiment was to find out how sens itive macrostability was to 
change s  in the search rate. Since a low search rate, in effect, related 
to a high preference for microstability, it can be seen that the trade-off 
is "'.'ery large ( s e e  Chart 12). 
The declines in the number of technological recipes reflect 
adoption of b e s t  a vailable practic e s ;  increases reflect a search for 
a better menu. 
The Degree of Openn e s s  Versus the Internal Degree of 
Democracy: As sume there are two communities which have decided 
they would prefer .to deal with the risks involved in bringing about 
productivity gains rather than deal with the risks of inflation. And 
also a s sume that output per unit of input in one of the communities is 
increasing a t  just twice the rate of the other. What are the a s s ociated 
differences in mic:::-obehavior if it is as sumed that both communities 
continue to br ing about the same rate of productivity incr e a s e ?  
Assume the internal degree of democracy can be defined in 
terms of (�) the availability of imaginative people; and (b) the constraints 
imposed on their interactions. Also as sume o rganizations can po s s e s s  
a \vide diversity o f  people with respect to their openne s s ,  and that such 
a diversity can be measured on a diversity of people index on a scale 
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from zero to one: when the index is zero, people are only technically 
alive and have no capability whatsoever to generate a diversity of ide a s ;  
and when the index is one, they can generate a bewildering a s s o rtment 
of ideas. 
The a s sumption that 1 1opennes s 1 1  and 1 1 creativity11 are positively 
correlated corresponds with the findings of a number of post- Freudian 
psycholog i s t s .  The measure of openne s s  is tolerance of ambiguity; and 
they have found that while intelligence (as measured by the standard 
intelligence tests) matters up to a certain threshold (which is diffe rent 
for diffe rent profe s s ions), be yond the threshold tolerance of ambiguity 
is a better predictor. 26 Not surprisingly, people with a high tolerance 
of ambiguity tend to have had a wide dive rsity of experienc e s .  
Organizations exist mainly for the purpose o f  imposing 
constraints on their members. And an organization which impos e d  no 
constraints on its members would be incapable of resolving a dilemma. 
Therefore, we also can hypothe size a dive rsity of interactions index 
(Dp ) on a scale from zero to one: when the index is zero, the inter­
actions are entirely constrained, and human diversity goes' completely 
to waste. When there are no constraints on the interactions, the 
organization features an infinite amount of movement but no motion: 
people have all sorts of interesting ide a s ,  but the organization, as such, 
has no capability to resolve a dilemma, 
Now, there are various ways to measure the dive rsity of the 
interactions. However, the best s ingle measure I have been able to 
discover is the randomne s s  in their communications: organizations in 
which the interactions are highly constrained po s s e s s  little randomne s s  
i n  the communications. 
Excellent examples of firms po s s e s s ing a low degree of 
openne s s  and very little randomne s s  in their communications are to be 
found in the Cyert and March book, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 27 
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in which was found communication went up and down, and organizations 
searched for new alternatives very narrowly. Indeed, this r e s earch is 
very much in the tradition initially e s tablished by Weber, because he
too was primarily interested in highly structured firms optimized, so 
to speak, for the minimization of conflict. However, it may be assumed 
that if the computer conipanies had displayed the same type of behavior 
they never would have been able to use computers to run their s imulation s .  
O n  the other hand, excellent examples o f  firms pos s e s sing "both 
high and low degrees of openne s s  are to be found in the Burns and 
. 28 Stalker book, The Management of Innovation. My main diffe renc,2 
with them is tha t they class ify firms into two types -- "mechanistic" 
and "organic11 (with the organic displa ying a higher degree of internal 
democracy) - - whereas one should consider an entire spectrum of 
organizations in thei:r capability to engage in dynamic behavior. 
Actually, even more interes ting examples of dynami c behavior 
than they relate are to be found in a type of R&D o:rganization commonly 
known a s  a 1 1 s kunkworks11 - - an organization in which engineers work 
directly with machinists and an approach is followed that is both highly 
pragm.atic and highly interactive. Thomas Edison is usually given 
credit for having discovered this type of organization. But it was also 
employed by Charles Kettering; and as far as the chemical industry 
i s  concerned, for many years skunkworks represented the standard 
operating procedure for pioneering new products. From the point of 
view of generating new ideas, a highly e"ffi cient organization is almost 
the direct antithesis of Webe r 1 s  ideal organization (which was optimized 
for an unchanging external environn1ent ) .  29
I t  should be emphasized, though, that dynamic organizations 
contain no t  only a great deal of conflict on how to achieve cer tain 
g enerally accepted goals.  T h e y  also contain a good deal of trust, 
because personal relationships predicated on achieving no worse 
results than in a zero- sum game are unlikely to achieve any better. 
And more randomnes s  in the communications implies more trust than 
an organization who se internal relationships are highly structured, 
Indeed, the degree of trust is the indicator research managers them­
s e lves pay most attention to: when people say 11! don't know, but let's 
find out, " they feel the organization is healthy. But when the top 
echelon people expect definite answers to every question, then they 
regard trust in short supply. 
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Consequently, it can be seen that the rate of progress depends 
on {a) diversity of people in terms of their openne s s ;  and (b) the 
diversity of the interactions. And these two factors define the internal 
degree of democracy of an organization. Moreover, also a s sume that 
fortuitous events can play an important role. Then, on the basis of the 
abov.e definitions, we can say, in very general terms, that the rate of 
progress ( L\. E )  is a function of the diversity of people (Dp),  the 
diversity of their interactions (Di) and luck (L) or;
II E = f(Dp, Di; L) 
Now, to return to the main question: How can an organization 
be optimized for dealing with a high degree of risk in its external 
environment and, therefore, for rapid progr e s s ?  Budget permitting, 
obviously a wide diversity of people would be advantageou s ,  with not 
all at the upper end of the scale. If there were only imaginative people, 
we would obtain many niarvelous ideas -- but it  is  unlikely the airplane 
would fly. On the other hand, if we had only unimaginative people, it 
would be imp o s s ible to make any new history. So, while overcoming 
larger discontinuities imp o s e s  a greater requirement on imaginative 
people than overcoming minor dis continuitie s ,  even when pioneering 
new technologies it would be desirous to have more and l e s s  imaginative 
people. 
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Next, what happens to the degree o f  constraint when i t  is  
imposed on peopl e 1 s  interactions? If the Di index were 1 ,  the inter­
actions would be completely unconstrained; and it would be impossible 
to bring order out of chaos (i. e . , the state of unorganized organization 
[UO) ). On the other hand, if the index were 0, the organization \.vould 
be incapable of engaging in any unpredictable behavior. And if the 
relationship is plotted between the dynamic capability of the orga!lization 
and its internal degree of structure, We would have the following type 
of curve; 
CH.ART 1 3  
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DEGREE OF STRUCTURE 
As the chart indicates,  the organization is optimized for a 
high rate of progre s s  when it is in the s tate of organized disorganization 
(OD) -- a state in which maximum advantage is taken of human diversity, 
because the only c:onstraints imposed on the interactions are thos e
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imposed by the o verall mission of the organization. With no constraints 
on the interactions it is a completely �npredictable organizat'ion (UO). 
O n  the other hand. with the interactions completely prescribed, it is a 
completely predictable organized organization (00). And when the 
organization is in the s tate of organized disorganization (OD), it is in 
the b e s t  pos ition to put luck on its side: if it is in the state of unorganized 
organization, only luck can bring order out of chaos. And if it is in the 
s tate of highly organized organization, its ability to detect and r e s olve 
a dilemma will depend rriainly on luck, which is to say, it will p o s s e s s  
a low degree of dynamic stability. 
The r e a s o n  the state of organized dis organization c o r r e s ponds 
to the optimal degree of openne s s  is this : to detect and resolve a 
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dilemma in its external environment an, organization must pos s e s s  
th e  .capability to rapidly r e s tructure itself i n  the light o f  new circum­
stances (e. g . , as in the example of Mr s .  Bunker). And as an 
organization becomes more and inore s t r u c tured, the l e s s  likely it 
will b e  able to p e r c eive negative feedback, let alone r e solve dilemma s .  
It m u s t  b e  emphasized, ho\vever, the matter o f  the optimal 
d e g r e e  of organization cannot be divorced from the degree of uncertainty 
in the external environment of the organization. If we think of inter­
a c tive organizations as democratic o r ganization s ,  then it can be said, 
when the s e a s  a r e  stormy, macrostability \Vill require a higher degree 
of unpredictable microbehavior, and when calm, no diversity of 
behavior will be n e c e s s a r y .  In fact, if t.\ E  is to be kept at z e r o ,  
then either a society would b e  required which generated a z e r o  diversity 
of ideas o r  was ruled by a dictator who imposed such tight cons traints 
that all diversity went to waste (i. e . ,  dp = 0 ,  o r  di = 0).
The conclusion: the demand conditions for progr e s s  are 
d e t e r mined b y  the degree of compe titive and technological risk in the 
various indu s trie s ;  and the c o r r e s ponding 11supply11 conditions a r e  
determined b y  the internal degree o f  democracy. I t  can b e  assumed 
that the lower the rate of progress in the industry in question, the 
lower the degree of democracy as measured by, say, the randomne s s  
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o f  the communications . In other words, there i s  no Say's Law for ideas.
Supply neither automatically creates demand nor does demand auto­
matically create supply. Imaginative people may be available in firms, 
but if they engage in little dynamic competition (i. e . , a low degree of 
interaction) diversity will go to waste. Or there may be genuine 
opportunities for progr e s s ;  but if people are o verly constrained (i. e . , 
a low di) divers ity also will go to waste.
What can we say about a world in which C1E = 0, a world i:n 
which there is no progr e s s ,  and all firms are assumed to be in an 
equilibrium with an unchanging outside environment? Logically speaking, 
there is nothing wrong with the classical theory of an equilibrium. Nor 
i s  there anything wrong with the classical law of supply and demand, 
providing it is as sumed the economic system is closed, which is to say, 
demand and supply curves are taken a s  give n s .  In a closed system, the 
class ical law of supply and demand will make very good predictions,, 
indeed. And in real VJorld markets approximating those conditions 
good predictions can be made. Howe ver, to a s s ume that all firms a.re 
in an equilibrium with an unchanging external environment, and that 
the law of supply and demand generally holds, is to assume either an 
imaginary dilemmal e s s  world (imaginary, because it is inconsistent: 
with the laws of nature) for which all the alternatives are fully known 
( A E  = 0) or a world with no human diversity (i . e . ,  dp = 0). 
Actually, given the fact there is a diversity of people in the 
world, and new dilenunas are cons tantly arising, all societies mu s t  
have a history - - whether it be a history in discovering new truths or 
new myths. Even the so- called "primitive equilibrium societie s "  do 
have a very rich history in myths ! But they hardly can be called 
1 1democratic" societie s ,  because they waste their dive rsity. 
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So let us now return to reality. Which conditions are the 
cause and which the effect? In dynamic theory it is impo s s ible to 
neatly separate cause and effect. Thu s ,  the necessity of sur viving in 
an environment of high risks can cause firms to become highly inte r ­
active within. O n  the other hand, a high degree o f  internal structure 
can have the effect of pre venting firms from dealing with a higher 
degree of risk. This i s  because inc reases in the degree o f  organization 
tend to be quite irreversible - - it is easier to become organized than 
disorganized ! Indeed, this is the more fundamental reason why 
economists should be genuinely concerned when the rate of productivity 
increase declines in a country. Whether one is concerned with 
increasing productivity- gains or lower ing the rate of environmental 
degradation, highly structured firms cannot deal with unpredictability. 
IV.. POLICY I:rviPLICA TIONS 
No one can prove that we face a chronic inflation problem in 
this country, just as during the Great Depres sion no one could prove 
prosperity was not right around the corner. Howeve r ,  I think e vents 
will prove we do face such a problem, and for the following reasons; 
a decline in the ability of business firms to deal with risk and uncertainty; 
the increasing preoccupation of the labor unions with micros tability; 
and the s o - called s table g r owth policies pursued by the government. 
A Decline in the Ability of Business Firms tc Deal With 
Unce rtainty and Risk: The post-lh' orld War 11 industrial re volutions 
in compute r s ,  communications, television, s ynthetic fibe r s ,  commercial 
aircraft and con1puterized machine tools generated a good deal of 
competition to exploit new technological gold mine s ,  The fact that 
major technological advances tend to come in bunches is not, of course, 
s omething that is new in American history. In fact, Kuznets and 
Schumpeter, among othe r s ,  have given this bunching primary emphasis 
in their explanations of the 11long wave s 1 1  in e conomic activities. In 
fact, what distinguishes the post-World War II industrial r e vclutions 
from earlier ones is that they were so widespread, and involved a 
large segment of United States industry. 
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The fact w e  '\Vere a technological leader for roughly a half 
century meant, in turn, that in trading with the r e s t  of the world we 
exported goods with a :relatively high unpredictability content, imporb2d 
goods with a relatively high predictability content -- and had a relative 
advantage in organi.'2:ed disorganization. 
Howeve r ,  the los s of our technological leadership i s  a 
r e flection of the fact that the postwar revolutions in technology are 
dying out, that is, with the major exception of the computer industry. 
And a l o s s  of our technological leadership, in turn, has meant a decline 
in the openne s s  of American firms, and an increasing degree of internal 
structure. The decline in openness is reflected by the 1nuch smaller 
degree of interaction between universities and bus ine s s  firms -- some­
thing which has alarmed both deans of engineering schools and business 
leaders, The increase in the internal degree of bureaucracy is reflected 
in the g rowing student dissatisfaction with large busine s s  firms, Fot: 
example, whereas in 1 9 5 5, 80 percent of Caltech graduates taking first 
p o s itions went into business firms, today the corresponding ratio is 
only 20 percent. And almost all of these are going to relatively small 
firms, Going back for a period of about thirty- five years, a very good 
indicator of where the technological rev olutions are is whe re the stuc'ients 
are going ! For example , during the 1 9 3 0 s  the airc raft industry dre'-"' 
many students, and during the 1 9 2 0 s ,  so did the automobile industry. 
So, what the dying out of the postwar r e volutions really means 
is a diminution of the ability of United States firms to deal with risk 
and uncertainty: fe�er opportunities for adventure. This means not 
only a poorer ability to bring about productivity gains in this country, 
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but in other countries of the world. For example, the Canadians are 
t rying to deal \Vith their chronic inflation problem by initiating public 
R&D programs to increase the rate of productivity advance. Howeve r ,  
i f  the fundamental problem is the inability o f  Canadian indu s t r y  to deal 
with risk and uncertainty, it  is  doubtful if much will come out of this 
effort.  In providing competition for Canadian firms, we provided the 
equivalent of a highly effective antitrust division. And that is where 
the basic problem lie s ,  because it  is  competition which determines the 
demand for new ideas. 
As far a s  this country is concerned, the problem is to determine 
how to prevent such a decline in competition from occurring that we find 
ourselves in the same position as Britain: a country which has little or 
no ability to search for or exploit new technological potentials. But 
for this country this is not a new problem. The trust movement of the 
1890s reflected the same tendency o f  business firms to turn towards 
empire - building when they could not deal with problems at home, a s  
we a r e  witne s sing today. And i n  the campaign o f  1 9 12 ,  one of the major 
issues debated by Lou-is Brandeis was whether this country should 
regulate monopoly or promote competition. The main difference 
between now and then is that we now live in a more interconnected 
world, which means that competition is all the more important as far 
as macrostability is concerned. 
The Que s t  of the Labor Unions for Microstabili_!y: Bargain­
ing for higher wages does not necessarily threaten the macrostability 
of a country. Indeed, it can be argued the demand for higher wages 
has played the same role in s timulating advances in productivity as 
has competition. Howe ver, t o  an increasing degree the labor unions 
in this country are imposing constraints on productivity gains to protect 
a way of life . And the effect of such constraints is to reduce the ability 
of busine s s  firms to bring about productivity gains, even when the 
conditions are favorable for competition and risk- taking. Consider, 
for exampl e ,  the construction industry, which encompas s e s  a large 
number of firms whose innovative behavior is highly cons trained due 
to the labor unions and building codes. And consider the trucking 
industry, which in its featherbedding practices is becoming more and 
more like the railroads. 
67 
The desire of the labor unions to protect the security of their 
member s  i s ,  of cours e ,  quite unde r s tandable. We do live in a highly 
s p e c ialized economy; and as people become more and more specialized, 
they become l e s s  and l e s s  able to deal with unpredictability. For 
example, for someone who has been a printer all of his life or is a 
highly specialized toolmaker, the c o s t  of progress can be very high, 
indeed. And most economists agree that if we are to preserve a 
dynamic society, the i s sues of humanitarianism must be separated 
fro� the issues of progr e s s .  However, it is much easier to say this 
ought to be done than to determine how it should be done. 
The Stable Growth Policies of the Government: What s table 
growth has come to mean is protecting the microstability of business 
firms and labor unions. And if w-e lived in an imaginary, dilemmale ss 
world, then there would be no question that the promotion of micro­
s tability would result in the prornotion of macrostability. Howe ver, as 
we have seen, macrostability is promoted by a high degree of unpredict­
able microbehavior. So, while governments may think they are 
promoting stability, in reality they are promoting instability!  What 
stable growth policies really amount to is a pres cription to make the 
United States economy into one \.Vhich features the same degree of 
microstability as the British economy. 
Furthermo r e ,  it must be remembe red we do not only face the 
need to bring about productivity gains at a more rapid rate: we also 
face adapting our society to a new set of environmental constraints and 
energy shortages as a permanent way of life. Many people talk about 
1 1cleaning up the environment11 as if it were a once- and-for-all job. 
But the fact of the matter i s  that whenever certain ill- defined rates of 
biological or physical irreversibilities are exceeded, serious 
environmental degradation problems will result. 
Thus, the real problem facing this country i s  how to bring 
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about more rapid advances in productivity while making smooth progress 
when dealing with the environmental issues -- progr e s s  which will 
require adjustments throughout the economic system. Furthermore, 
there i s  no way of avoiding these problems: if industry manages to 
conserve its predic tability, the cities will be made more unpredictable. 
Needed Research; I am confident dynamic theory ultimately 
will have the same impact on economics as it has had in the fields of 
chemistry and biology. How can an e conomic system be described 
without taking '1openne s s 1 1  into account? However, I am also sure that 
no more than in those fields will the r e volutions be made in a day. 
Quite obviously, e conomists cannot decide whether the 
appropriate goal for a society is macr o s tability or micr o s tability. 
Who are we to s a y  societies ought to exist for the living rather than 
for the dead? What we can do is to do r e s earch which would ( 1 )  provide 
policymake r s  and the public at large with a better picture of the trade­
offs between micro- and macrostability; and (2) provide them with 
re search on the i s su e s  involved in increasing the dynamic behavior of 
various sectors of the economy. Research which would contribute to 
these purpo s e s  is as follows : 
Measures of Dynamic Performance: Obviously, we would 
like to have quantitative measures of both the rate of progress and of 
the inputs to dynamic processes ( e . g . , the degree of randomne s s  in 
the internal communications ) .  Ideally, what we would like to know is 
the rate total factor productivity is increasing indu stry .by industry, 
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and the particular indu stries or sectors of industry which are the main 
suppliers of new knowledge. For example , more information is needed 
on the importance of subcontractors as suppliers of new knowledg e .  
As for the internal characteristics o f  organizations, 
p sychologi sts have devised tests for measuring tolerance of ambiguity 
(i. e . , " openne s s " ) ,  and have found that in s e veral dynamic corporations 
it provides a better predictor of who w ill make it into the middle 
management than :the s tandard intelligence tests.  But what is even 
more needed is some '\Vay, even if it i s  a very rough way, to measure 
the internal interactions of organizatiorrs . Needed, in other words, 
i s  a way to measure what social arithropologists observe. 
Response to Incr eases in the Degree of Risk and Uncertainty: 
As sume that firms remain in an equilibrium with their outside 
environments in the sense that the degree of competitive and technological 
risk does not change s ignificantly. Then we can predict that when the 
internal degree of risk is high, so will the internal degree of democ:racy 
b e  high; and when i t  is low, the firm will be n1ore highly structured. 
Anyone who has visited a r e search and development org anization in the 
automobile indu stry and, say, the computer industry can tell the 
diffe rence. In highly structured organizations, ambiguity simply i s
not tolerated, Moreove r ,  we also know the internal incentive s of firtns 
are adjusted to make them better able or worse able to deal with risk 
and uncertainty. For example, the chemical indu stry and the computer 
indu stry deliberately feature a good deal of internal competition - ­
competition in i d e a s .  Thu s ,  I B M  makes i t s  subsidiaries all o v e r  the 
world compete with each othe r .  The test for the subsidiary in Britain 
i s  not how well it did in terms of its British competitor, but how well 
it did in terms of the b e s t  comparable American establishment. The 
petroleum industry does not feature internal competition. But it doe s 
have profe s s ional " s kunk s ' 1  in the top managell:P nt to re mind the 
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vice - p r e sidents they live in a world of strong uncertaintie s .  And in 
the automobile indu s t r y  the internal incentives are structured in a way 
so that advancement depends on ability to protect the or ganization 
from risk. For example, employe e s '  benefits are computed in a way 
so that leaving the firm becomes increasingly expensive. 
But what we do not unders tand at all well i s  the dynami cs 
involved when o rgallizations must become adjusted to a higher degree 
of risk: what limits the s e  proces s e s ?  We do know the adjustments 
typically s e e m  more difficult in prospect than they do in retrospect. 
Furthe rmore, we know that, while small increases in the degree of 
risk will have no significant effect on behavior ,  when the chang e s  
become significant, highly discontinuous chang e s  d o  occur. For 
example , airline companies will not change their affiliations to buy 
an aircraft which i s ,  say, 5 percent cheaper than the airplanes they are 
now u s ing. But when the diffe rence gets to be about 15 percent, 
competitive pressures result in a very substantial change in affiliations. 
In fact, firms engaged in developing commercial aircraft use 15 percent 
as a rule of thumb figure when de ciding whether to develop a new plane. 
What we do not understand is the process which occurs in airline 
companies when they change their affilia tions. To be sure, once the 
process has started, competitive pressures force other companies to 
follow suit. However, if you had to bet on which airline company would 
be willing to make the plunge first, what Would you want to know about 
the internal characteristics of the compani e s ?  What particular internal 
characteristics facilitate dealing with a higher degree of risk and 
uncertainty, and what are the trade- offs involve d ?  
These questions a r e  at the heart of many public policy i s s ue s .  
For example, i f  one considers effluent taxes a s  taxes t o  better internalize 
risks , then it obviou sly ;,vould be desirable lo know more than v.:e do 
today about the macroscopic effects likely to be produced by incre a s ing 
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the rates. Obviously, if the agency engaged i n  administering such a 
tax had complete freedom, it could experiment with the rates until it 
achieved the desired performance. But given the opposition to changes 
in tax rate s ,  this happens to be a field in which the "cosit'  of experi­
mentation i s  very high. So, granting it probably w ould be impos s ible 
to make highly accurate predictions, we s till would like the ability to 
tnake better informed rather than worse informed gue s s e s .  The 
prob!Cms of the environment v.:ill be with us forever. And the alternative 
to better incentive s to internalize risks is direct regulation, which does 
not get at the basilc problem of improving performance nor make profits 
a function of performance. Therefore, if the promotion of competition 
is regarded as a more de s irable instrument than regulation, we need 
to know more about how incentives designed to increase the degree of 
ris_k internalization are likely to affect openne s s  and the degree of 
dynamic behavior. 
Ano ther important policy issue - - perhaps the most important 
policy issue of our times - - is how to structure public organizations 
to increase their dynamic capability: their capability to engage in 
unpredictable behavior when the outside environment chang e s .  It \vould 
be nice, of course, ii there were an automatic hidden hand to internalize 
risks so that public organizations could be count�d upon to be predictably 
unpredictable. Unfortunately, however, there is no such hidden hand. 
The que s tion a r is e s ,  therefore: how can they be structured to take into 
account not only information about new technological opportunitie s ,  
but also changes in the wishes of the people? For the most part, 
public organizations generate a low diversity of ideas, and seem to 
be biased in repre senting particular types of ints:: r e s t s .  How, then, 
does one structure such organizations so they are better repres entative 
of the divers ity of ideas in society at large? What are the particular 
factors which li:mit their openne s s ?  And what types of incentives are 
required? 
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The Promotion of Competition: Say that you want to regulate 
some industry from the point of view of preventing prices from 
increasing "too r apidly. '1 How do you do it? In order to kno�· whether 
the industry is doing a good job in exploiting its technological p o s s ibiliti e s ,  
obviously some knowledge would b e  needed o f  the poss ibilitie s .  How 
do you obtain it? You might set up your own research and development 
organization to compete with industry. Brandeis, for example, once 
suggested that the ICC s hould set up its own equivalent of the agricultural 
experimental stations. Or some v.'ay might be _found to increase the 
dynamic performance of industry so you could have a g:r:eater dive r s ity 
of alternatives to compare. But once either alte rnative is considered, 
we are cons idering the promotion of competition rather than the 
regulation of monopcily. 
The main problem with F l regulation, 11 as it has been practiced 
in �his country, is that it does not do either one of these things, Quite 
typically, the regulatory agency becomes a product of its environment, 
and forms an alliance with the regulated industry to prevent all change. 
Indeed, it  is not too much of an exaggeration to state that becoming 
regulated by the government of the United States is something like 
losing a war to the United Sta_te s: the "government will look after your 
s e curity forever. 
On the other hand, it also must be acknowledged there are 
very serious problems involved in promoting competition which can 
generate a diversity of ideas, and provide the economy as a whole with 
a dynamic insurance policy, inasmuch as it is aimed at reducing the 
risks of pollution or inflation. One of these problems has to do with 
the formulation of criteria for judging acceptable performance. Under 
what circumstances should firms in an industry be diss olved, because 
instead of cooperating by competing they are cooperating by imposing 
risks on the public at large? To what extent should busine s s  firms be 
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allowed to make their lives more predictable, at the expense of making 
someone else 1 s  life l e s s  pre dictable? The other has to do with extend­
ing antitrust legislation to include constraints imposed by labor uniono; 
on productivity gains or on progre s s  aimed <it lowering the rate of 
environmental degradation. 
The Criterion Problem: Concentration ratios have one principal 
advantage and one principal drawback as a criterion for determining the 
effective ne s s  of competition. The advantage is that they supply a fairly 
unambiguous criterion for antitrust action, which Blackstone lawyers 
(lawyers who go by the books) hopefully can carry out. The dis advantage 
is that market power is not likely to impo se a reas onable test of 
comp e tition as measured in terms of the degree of risk competitors 
imp o s e  upon e ach other. To be sure, there is a real danger that if an 
entire industry becomes dominated by a single firm, it will destroy the 
industr y 1 s  ability to engage in unpredictable behavior. But short of 
do:rii.inance there is no magic number of firms which is required. 
On the other hand, "the extent to which firms do or do not 
engage in consonant behaviorn has one iidvantage and one disadvantage. 
The advantage of such a criterion is that it makes good sense, The 
disadvantage is that it does not lead to automatic rules for dissolving 
a business corporation for failure to engage in competition. If we knew 
beforehand just how large the technological potential was in the indust:ry 
concerned, then, of cour s e ,  there would be no problem in deciding 
whether there was sufficient cooperation in the industry to exploit the 
potential. However, since there is no way of measuring the potential, we 
can only infer whether there is a sufficient degree of cooperation, as 
measured, for example, by the ability of an industry to meet foreign 
competition, And the disadvantage of such an approach is that it stands 
as an open invitation to application of a 1'rule of season, 11 and to 
nonenforcement of the antitrust la'llS, 
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S o ,  what can be done about the apparent dilemma involved in 
providing reasonable criteria for antitrust enforcement? If we insist 
upon unambiguous rules which can be carried out by strict constitutionalists , 
we have no hope of coming up with rules which will" make sense (that i s ,  
except i n  a n  imaginary unchanging world). On the other hand, i f  we 
insist upon sensible rules, then there is no as surance Blacks tone 
lawyer s  can carry them out. This is a very thorny question; it will 
require a goOd deal of further work. 
Regulation of the Labor Unions: These are the same kinds of 
thorny problems, For example , some constraints o n  productivity 
incre a s e s  are for reasons of health and safety. But just where do you 
draw the line? 
These are tough que stions. All one can say i s  that if people 
refuse to grapple with them we will end up with an ec onomy which 
features micros tability and not macros tability. 
L 
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